



Authentication and Authorisation for Research and Collaboration

## Incident Response

Sirtfi and Beyond


**Hannah Short**

CERN Computer Security


AARC NA3

WISE


March 27<sup>th</sup> 2017



Incident Response in Distributed Infrastructures



Impact of Identity Federations




Filing the gaps

# Incident Response in Distributed Infrastructures

# Security Incident Response in Distributed Infrastructures

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## Shared Policies

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- Written rules, and obligations
- Clear basis for exclusion from infrastructure if not followed
- Reasonable likelihood that sites follow best practices in security

# Operational Support

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- Incident preparation and prevention - cascade advisories, IOCs, patches etc
- Coordinate incident response across multiple Sites
- Power to block problematic Sites & users

# Trust


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- Fundamentally, incident response is more successful when the individuals know and trust each other
- Online trust
  - Consistent, trustworthy behaviour
  - Voluntary collaboration
- Offline trust
  - Key exchange
  - Verification that you are a real person 😊

# Security Incident Response Models

AARC Project Deliverable DNA3.2 provided opportunity to:


- Analyse existing models
- Consider Security Incident Response Procedures in the context of eduGAIN (stay tuned for the second part of this talk!)




<https://aarc-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/DNA3.2-Security-Incident-Response-Procedure-v1.0.pdf>




# Fully Distributed Model



During Incident Response  
*Information shared between all participants*




Post-Incident-Report Sharing  
*Information shared between all participants*



During Incident Response

*Information shared between affected participants*



Post-Incident-Report Sharing


*Information shared between all participants*

# Impact of Identity Federations

# Federated Identity Management Worldwide

## What is a Federation?

- Federated Identity Management (**FIM**) is the concept of groups of Service Providers (**SPs**) and Identity Providers (**IdPs**) agreeing to interoperate under a set of policies.
- Federations are typically established nationally and use the SAML2 protocol for information exchange
- Each entity within the federation is described by metadata




<https://www.switch.ch/aai/about/federation/>

# Federated Identity Management Worldwide

## eduGAIN


- eduGAIN is a form of interfederation
- Participating federations share information (metadata) about entities from their own federation with eduGAIN
- eduGAIN bundles this metadata and publishes it in a central location.



Credit to Alessandra Scicchitano – GEANT for this slide


# Our Interaction with Identity Federations

- Research Communities typically join through an SP-IdP proxy
  - From the outside (eduGAIN) it looks like an SP
  - From the inside it looks like an IdP
- We depend on the stability of eduGAIN as an authentication infrastructure!




*The SP-IdP Proxy Model. Source: GEANT, GN3PLUS13-642-23*

# Security Incident Response in Distributed Infrastructures



# The challenge of Federated Identity Management


- EduGAIN membership includes 4 policies...  
Security Incident Response is not one
- We have no insight into security practices of each participant
- Collaboration between IdPs and SPs is essential to build full incident timeline – they have no obligation to collaborate





# The challenge of Federated Identity Management


- EduGAIN has no central help desk
- Few national federations offer central security support
- No way to block an identity, IdP, or federation everywhere and immediately



# The challenge of Federated Identity Management

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- Security is often not priority (or even in skillset) of engaged FIM participants
- Simply too big...




# 2360 IdPs

Potential sources of compromised identities

# 1493 SPs

Potential targets

# What can we do?



Clearly an inviting attack surface... luckily, this was noticed several years ago!

## Beginnings

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- Issues of IdM raised by IT leaders from EIROforum labs (Jan 2011)
  - CERN, EFDA-JET, EMBL, ESA, ESO, ESRF, European XFEL and ILL
  - These laboratories, as well as national and regional research organizations, face similar challenges
- Prepared a paper that documents common requirements  
<https://cdsweb.cern.ch/record/1442597>

*“Security procedures and incident response would need to be reviewed. Today, each resource provider is for example responsible for terminating access by known compromised identities. With identity federation, this responsibility will be shifted to the IdP though resource providers will insist on the ability to revoke access.”*

*“Such an identity federation in the High Energy Physics (HEP) community would rely on:*

- A well-defined **framework** to ensure sufficient **trust** and **security** among the different IdPs and relying parties.”

# Evolution

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Several years later, 2016

Security  
Incident  
Response  
Trust Framework for  
Federated  
Intity

- ✓ Approved by the REFEDS (Research & Education FEDerations) Community
- ✓ Registered Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Assurance Profile <https://www.iana.org/assignments/loa-profiles/loa-profiles.xhtml>

## Operational Security

- Require that a security incident response capability exists with sufficient authority to mitigate, contain the spread of, and remediate the effects of an incident.

## Incident Response

- Assure confidentiality of information exchanged
- Identify trusted contacts
- Guarantee a response during collaboration

## Traceability

- Improve the usefulness of logs
- Ensure logs are kept in accordance with policy

## Participant Responsibilities

- Confirm that end users are aware of an appropriate AUP

# Current adoption

Who?	AA	IDP	SP	(blank)	Grand Total
Greece		3	1		4
Austria		1			1
Luxembourg		1			1
Corea		1			1
Switzerland	4	5	1		10
UK	2	3	2		7
Ireland		6			6
Italy	1	2			3
Netherlands		103	2	3	108
Sweden	4	5			9
Lithuania		1			1
USA	4	8			12
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>163</b>



# Find out more



☎ Call us : +31(0)20 5304488 ✉ Mail us : [contact@refeds.org](mailto:contact@refeds.org)



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## SIRTFI

# <https://refeds.org/sirtfi>

[REFEDS > SIRTFI](#)

The Security Incident Response Trust Framework for Federated Identity (Sirtfi) aims to enable the coordination of incident response across federated organisations. This assurance framework comprises a list of assertions which an organisation can attest in order to be declared Sirtfi compliant.

REFEDS' [Sirtfi Working Group](#) has been active since 2014 and combines expertise in operational security and incident response policy from across the REFEDS community. Work to publish and implement the Sirtfi Trust Framework is supported by the [AARC Project](#).



### Benefits

Why should I join? What are the [Benefits](#)?



### Sirtfi v 1.0

View the [Sirtfi Framework](#)




### FAQs

Need [help](#)?

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# How does Sirtfi help?


# How does Sirtfi help?



- Shared framework fulfills purpose of basic policy
  - Obligated to collaborate
  - Basic operational security best practices
- Allows us to identify security conscious bodies

# How does Sirtfi not help?

- Some Federation Operators unwilling to act as gatekeepers
- No large-scale blocking mechanism
- Trust tied to organisation/entity, not individual
  - Difficult to build offline trust
- No shared procedures



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# Filling the gaps

# How can we build the necessary security capability for eduGAIN?

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## Operational Support


- eduGAIN itself announced early this year that they will provide a support platform capable of coping with roughly 200 tickets per year
- Security Incidents will be in scope of this team by Autumn

## Trust


- Identified need for Trust Portal
- Crowd source trust and provide method for identifying confidence in an entity outside metadata

# Incident Response Procedure for Interfederation

- DNA3.2 provides template procedures based on EGI/WLCG and inspired by common practices
- Leverages existing trusted relationships in Identity Federations
  - Sort of “nested hub” →
- Research Communities (RCs) need procedures for two purposes:
  - eduGAIN to secure itself
  - eduGAIN to cooperate with us during an incident



# Role of Research Communities



- Typical SPs do not have a mature security capability
- Many RCs have expertise and motivation to lead incident response and should be allowed to do so
- Procedures are flexible to allow the most appropriate entity to be the Incident Response Coordinator



## Next Steps

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Document has already had input from many sources

- Identity Federations (Germany, US, UK, Sweden, Switzerland)
- SPs (ORCID)
- Research Community Reps (CERN, EGI, KIT)
- Review by Scott Koranda (LIGO) and Leif Nixon

### Next steps

- Circulate *more* widely
- Encourage National Identity Federations to adopt similar policies
- Ensure that the eduGAIN support platform is able to effectively play the central role we need

# Thank you

## Any Questions?

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<http://aarc-project.eu/>

